In an essay published on November 12, 2026, philosopher Andrew T Brenner revisits Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s question: why is there something rather than nothing? Brenner’s proposal is not that the question has been settled. It is that an empty world might be less simple than it first appears.
Brenner distinguishes ontological truths, which concern existing things, from non-ontological truths, which he argues could hold even if nothing existed. His examples include truths of logic and mathematics, statements about what is possible or impossible, and statements that particular things do not exist. Some of these examples, especially moral truths, are more controversial than others.
On this view, a world without things would not necessarily be free of truths requiring explanation. An existing thing might make the overall account simpler if it explained enough of those truths. Brenner considers three possible candidates: God, an initial cosmic singularity, and human beings whose practices or attitudes might ground certain truths. He does not claim that any candidate succeeds. He suggests that appeals to God or a singularity might offer simpler accounts than an appeal to numerous, complex human beings, while acknowledging that each option needs much closer examination.
A further difficulty remains: even if the simplest account is the best one to believe, that does not show that simplicity causes reality to be as it is. Brenner considers whether reality might take a simpler form because it is simpler, but calls his proposal “extremely speculative.” His argument challenges the assumption that nothing must be simpler than something; it does not establish why this particular world exists.